200,000 rations of grain and 500,000 of provisions and 100 rounds of ammunition to be shipped to meet you. They were at first ordered to rendezvous at Port Royal; subsequently, orders were given to send one-half of these supplies to Pensacola. I added a supply of clothing, some wagons, harness, and quartermaster's stores. These estimates and orders appear to have been based upon a column of 30,000 men. As soon as your movements, as reported by the rebel papers, showed that you would probably strike the Atlantic coast, orders were given to send further supplies to Hilton Head, and having ascertained that your force was probably much greater than that noted above, I ordered more clothing and quartermaster's stores, and directed forage, hay, and grain for 30,000 animals to be shipped daily. Of course I have sent forward all subsistence and ammunition turned over to the Quartermaster's Department for shipment.

I presume that you have more animals now than when you started, and I desire to call your attention to the difficulty, as well as the expense, of furnishing a large army with forage on the Atlantic coast. With all the exertions of the forage officer of this department, with a practically unlimited command of money, he has not been able to accumulate at Washington and at City Point enough ling forage for the armies in Virginia to meet a few days' interruption by storm or ice. We can supply grain enough, but there is always a short supply of hay. He has agents in all the hay districts, and buys all the at he can in the great markets. Still the armies complain of short allowance of hay. If you have more animals than you need for intended operations they should be sent off to some point where the country can subsist them, or else you will, I fear, lows many by the diseases resulting from constant feeding on grain without enough long forage. If you reduce the number of animals to the lowest point consistent with safety and efficiency the hay we can procure will subsist them in better condition. The expense and difficulty of maintaining a large army stationary is enormous. the wonderful resources of the Northern States have enabled us thus far to keep the Army of the Potomac fully supplied,, and of the want of that it complains bitterly. Should you rest upon the coast, as the Army of the Potomac has done, this hay question will be a great difficulty. I presume, however, that your army will be actively employed, and live, as it has heretofore, to some extent, upon the enemy. I hope so, and I believe that if there be a general officer in the service who can effect this, it is yourself.

Congratulating you again upon your brilliant and successful operation, I am, most sincerely, your friend and servant,

M. C. MEIGS,

Quartermaster-General, Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army.

SPECIAL
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND FIELD ORDERS,
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Numbers 195.
Near Savannah, GA., December 15, 1864.

* * *

IV. 1. The reserve troops of Major-General Blair's command, Seventeenth Corps, will not be moved to the right by transports, as intimated in Special Field Orders, Numbers 194.

2. Major-General Blair is charged with constructing a wharf, suitable for landing supplies for this army, at such point on the river near King's Bridge as General Easton, chief quartermaster Military Divis-