sons remained in Shreveport from the 24th of March till the 4th of April, and the only reason given is that they were without ammunition, which could have been distributed in two hours. You had 400 or 500 men detailed from Walker's and Mouton's divisions at the various and sundry bureaus in Shreveport. About to fight a battle against a force you considered too strong for the whole army under your command, I appealed in vain for these men; yet after the great battle had been won-when you deprived me of command-all the men of Walker's division were returned to their colors, and that, too, when you were marching after a retreating foe with re-enforcements equal to his original strength.

General Price after foiling Steele, asked for only 4,000 infantry to complete his destruction. You take the field with 9,000 and are hourly drawing on me for more. Your communication closes by inviting me to Arkansas, where "I can place you on duty with increased rank, and would feel that I had left the conduct of operations in safe hands." What has occurred since you removed the conduct of operations from my hands after Pleasant Hill to change your opinion of my capacity? General, had you then left the conduct of operations in my hands Banks' army would have been destroyed before this; the fleet would have been in our hands or blown up by the enemy. The moral effect at the North and the shock to public credit would have seriously affected the war. By this time the little division of Polignac and Vincent's Louisiana cavalry would have been near the gates of New Orleans, prepared to confine the enemy to narrow limits; I would have been on the way with the bulk of my army to join Price at Camden, enriched with captured spoils of a great army and fleet; Steele would have been brushed from our path as a cobweb before the broom of a housemaid; we would have reached Saint Louis, our objective point, by midsummer and relieved the pressure from our suffering brethren in Virginia and Georgia. All this is as true as the living God and required no more than ordinary energy for its accomplishment. You might have had all the glory; I would have been contented to do the work either under you or General Price. Your confidential staff might have thrown the blame of every failure on me unrebuked, and claimed the credit of every success for you without contradiction. Not a word should have passed my lips when I heard it announced, as lately at Shreveport, that the signal victories of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were triumphs of your skill and strategy-victories which your communications to me show you to have had as little connection as with the "army in Flanders."

You speak of placing me on duty with increased rank. Has the President been pleased to promote me? If so, I have received no promotion. At the proper time, should the President think proper to reward any service of mine by giving me increased rank, I would be exceedingly grateful. Until that time comes I am content, for I have learned from my ancestors that it is the duty of a soldier so to conduct himself as to dignify titles and not derive advice and stated that I had always given you a hearty support. This statement is but just. For more than a year I have supported you, even when your policy was fatally wrong, for I believed it my duty to give my commander a warm and earnest co-operation. The events of the past few weeks have so filled me with discouragement