McNeil with a cavalry force estimated at 2,500 men, for the purpose of attacking Boonville by the Tipton road, I selected my position about half a mile from the river and placed the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke in line of battle to receive him. The enemy attacked them, but was easily driven back with considerable loss, and was afterward pursued by a portion of Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade a distance of twenty-one miles from Boonville with heavy loss, in spite of obstinate resistance and the ruggedness of the country over which the pursuit was made. (For full particulars, so far as the action of his own troops were concerned, see the report of Colonel Jackman, accompanying.)

Captain Anderson, who reported to me that day with a company of about 100 men, was immediately sent to destroy the North Missouri Railroad. At the same time Quantrill was sent with the men under his command to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad, to prevent the enemy, if possible, from throwing their forces in my front from Saint Louis. These officers I was informed afterward did effect some damage to the roads, but none of any material advantage, and totally failed in the main object proposed, which was to destroy the large railroad bridge that was in the end of Saint Charles County.

I moved that evening from Boonville to Chouteau Springs on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Boonville between 1,200 and 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night receiving information that there was a large number of arms (amounting to 5,000 stored in the City Hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke's division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman's brigade, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daylight and capture it, at the same time sending Brigadier-General Shelby with a small portion of his division and a section of his artillery to attack the town from the west side of the river at the same hour, to divert the attention of the enemy and protect their advance under the cover of the fire of his artillery. Owing to unforeseen difficulties in crossing the river Brigadier-General clark was unable to commence the attack for one hour after Brigadier-General Shelby had engaged them. The place was surrendered, but not until after the City Hall was destroyed and the arms consumed by fire. By the capture of this place, however, we obtained between 800 or 900 prisoners, about 1,200 small-arms, about the same number of overcoats, 150 horses, 1 steam-boat, and large amounts of underclothing. This enterprise was a great success, effected with but comparatively small loss on our side, and reflects great honor on all the parties concerned in it. The captured prisoners were paroled, such of the ordnance and other stores captured as could not be carried were distributed, and the remaining portion, together with the steam-boat, burned. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.) In the awards of praise contained in [them] the general commanding cordially concurs.

On the night of the 13th I encamped at Mr. Marshall's, marching fourteen miles, and on the next day marched to Jonesborough-a distance of eight miles-where I was joined by Major-General Fagan, who had been left behind at the La Mine. I there ordered Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby's old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than 800 or 1,000 men and one section of artillery by Longwood, and from thence to Sedalia, to attack the Federal force at that place if he should deem it advisable and prudent. This order was promptly and completely carried out by Brigadier-General Thomp-