"again have to ask the militia of Southern Kansas to aid in checking rebel approaches." Some field-works had been erected on the eastern border of Kansas, and I directed these to be armed and others immediately constructed, making the towns of Lawrence, Olathe, Paola, and Fort Scott much more secure against raids, and therefore allowing me to use volunteers and militia that would otherwise be needed to guard these places against bushwhackers. I also sent orders to General Blunt to stop his pursuit of Indians and come with all possible speed with such troops as could be spared to Council Grove, so as to be available against rebel invasion. The Second Colorado Regiment, stationed in the edge of Missouri, headquarters at Kansas City, had been ordered to report to me, but at the request of General Rosecrans, and in view of their convenient location, I allowed them to remain where they were. The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Eleventh Kansas Regiments Volunteer Cavalry and fractions of the Third Wisconsin were distributed in Southeast Kansas, convenient for concentration at any time and place. The battalion of Colonel Drake, 100-days' men, whose time was nearly out, and a portion of a new negro battery, all amounting to about 4,000 men, was all the available volunteers that I could command. Fortunately I had a large number of mountain howitzers attached to my cavalry regiments, and also three or four batteries of field guns, which were ordered forward and in readiness, so that, in view of the coming crisis, I had upward of thirty pieces of artillery ready for any field and so equipped as to move with the usual rapidity of cavalry. Heavy siege guns were distributed and well arranged at Fort Leavenworth, Leavenworth, Lawrence, Olathe, Paola, and Fort Scott. These preparatory arrangements were in full progress when i received your dispatch of the 24th of September, directing me that all my available force not required against Western Indians should be thrown south on the Fort Scott routes, and adding "large re-enforcements have been sent to the Arkansas to cut off the enemy's retreat."My reply to you, dated the 26th of September, informing you that "my main dependence must be on militia if Price's force come westward," was predicated on the well-founded supposition that I could not draw troops from the remote districts of my command (Upper Arkansas, Colorado, or Nebraska) in time to meet the probable crisis arising from Price's march. Fortunately I had, through the active exertions of Governor Carney, secured and distributed arms and equipments for a large portion of the militia. Butt another difficulty presented itself. The whole country was engaged in the great National and State political campaign, the very crisis of which seemed to culminate with Price's progress through Missouri. Motives, measures, and men were all distrusted. The Senators, Governor, and people, commanding, composing, and controlling this militia reserve were all fiercely engaged in this political strife. No time for using the militia could be more unfavorable. The ballot-box, not the bayonet, was the weapon sought by the militia, and it required the greatest exertions to draw attention of officers and men from the political to the military necessities of the hour. The work of organizing, arming, and mobilizing an army in thirty days under these circumstances was therefore a most difficult and perplexing duty, requiring the exercise of responsibilities which I hope will receive the approval or indulgence of my superiors, to whom I reported by telegraph almost daily. The enemy steadily advanced from his crossing of the Arkansas on the 8th of September, moving northeast through the State, striking the rich valley of Black River, where he increased and improved his forces by devastating that region

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