County) loaded with valuable goods and machinery which can reach their destination by no other road than through Owen's Valley. Besides this there are also on the road a great many thousand head of cattle, sheep, and hogs for the same destination. I have forwarded by Captain Dummer, who leaves to-day, a more fully detailed account for the information of Colonel Carleton, commanding Southern District of California, at Camp Wright.

I remain, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. KENNEDY.

[Indorsement.]

LOS ANGELES, April 23, 1862.

We certify that we have read the within statement and know Mr. Kennedy, and know him to be a reliable man.

H. R. ALEXANDER.

J. B. WINSTON.

J. G. BARKER,

Sutler Fifth Infantry California Volunteers.

J. JONES.

BACHMAN & CO.

PLEISHMAN & SEIBEL.

HEADQUARTERS HUMBOLDT MILITARY DISTRICT,
Fort Humboldt, April 24, 1862.

Major R. C. DRUM, U. S. Army,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific:

MAJOR: Since my personal examination of this country I have abandoned all idea of the possibility of capturing or subduing the Humboldt Indians (the only ones now in open hostility) by any military operations whatever in the usual sense of the term. This country alone contains some 3,000 square miles, and is made up of steep mountain ridges and covered, three-fourth of it, with dense forests, packed full of undergrowth and chaparral, all but impenetrable to white men, and with no communications but rough and difficult mountain trails in many places next to impassable. The taxk of bringing in the Indians scattered over such a country as this, stealthily moving about in small parties, never traveling in the known trails, always unseen, though constantly watching our movements by their spies and scouts; hiding when they stop in the most inaccessible places, would be like the task of bringing in all the ground squirrels or the foxes, and will have to be performed somewhat in a similar way. You will readily perceive that a combined movement over any section of the country by two or more columns of troops with the view of hemming them in is entirely out of the question, as such an operation would require a very large army. On completing my reconnaissance I saw that the first thing to be done as being the most urgent was to make such dispositions of the troops as to protect, so far as possible, the settlements which the Indians had yet spared and the principal routes. it was with this view that the three new posts were established on the Van Dusen, on Mad River, and on Redwood Creek. The commanders of these posts were instructed to keep one-half of their effective force constantly in the field for the capture of Indians. This instruction has been faithfully carried out, except when the want of mules for the transport of supplies has prevented. But it is obvious that these desoltory operations over a few isolated spots can accomplish but very little toward the object in view.