bridges by stockades, but beyond cutting the timber for this purpose nothing had been done.

Colonel Boone's command consisted of five companies of his regiment (Twenty-eighth Kentucky), averaging, according to his statement, about 75 men each, making a force of about 375 men. Of this force one company (Captain O'Neill's) was detached from the main camp, guarding the tunnel and railroad bridges on the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad.

On the night of the 11th instant Colonel Boone, at the request of Colonel Bruce, commanding at Bowling Green, detached two of the remaining four companies after a drove of beef cattle, intended for the rebel forces. This was done, notwithstanding the rebels were known to be in the vicinity, threatening his command. Although this was doubtless done with the best intentions, it appears to have been a very serious error. These two companies did not and could not return, and, as from all reports they threw away their arms when no enemy was in sight, it is perhaps as well that they did not return to their main body. As to their reasons for thus relinquishing their only means of defense I know not, as none of them were present to be examined. Future examination must decide upon their conduct. The absence of these two companies reduced the strength of the command to about 124 muskets.

It appears that the pickets were posted by Lieutenant Boone, the adjutant of the regiment, and cautioned to extra vigilance. The pickets were in the habit of relieving themselves at reveille and returning to camp. No pickets, mounted or foot, were posted during the day-time, and the excuse given for this great neglect is that the command was too weak.

It appears that Colonel Boone visited the pickets in and rear the town between 1 and 2 a. m. on the 12th and then went to his hotel, where his wife was lying sick, and remained there until about 4 o'clock. As he was about returning to his camp, and just as he was leaving the room, some dozen or more rebels confronted him and made him prisoner. No alarm whatever had been given either by the mounted pickets stationed on the Scottsville and Hartsville pikes respectively, at a distance of some 4 miles from town, or by the pickets between the town and the mounted pickets, or by the guards stationed in the city. Not a gun was fired by any of those to whom the safety of the command was intrusted, and everything goes to show that they were either asleep or shamefully neglecting their duty. The result was a shameful and complete surprise within two hours after Colonel Boone had left his guards "on the alert and doing their duty," and the surrender of the whole command in camp, on guard, and at the tunnel and bridges without a shot being fired for the defense of their position, the reputation of their State, or the honor of their country.

The sleeping of sentinels on their posts appears to have been of no uncommon occurrence, and yet no punishment proportionate to this offense appears to have been inflicted; and from the statement of one of the officers it seems that there was an almost total want of discipline in the command.

Colonel Boone appears to have been vigilant and endeavoring to perform his duty as well as possible with the means at his disposal. Whether or not the command could have made any defense with a hope of success after they were surprised and surrounded I will not attempt to decide; but the fault of the surprise must rest on the pickets and guards in a great measure.

The absence of all guards and pickets during the day, and especially