no evidence that impugns his skill or courage; on the contrary, he was very active on the day before the attack up to 9 p. m. in obtaining information and placing the post in a proper state of defense. Although it may be said that he should have immediately concentrated his forces and that any delay in so doing was dangerous, yet we find an ample apology for the delay in the facts that he was an entire stranger to the place and country, and that he was assured by Colonel Lester, who had preceded him in the command for two months, that there was no danger of an attack and that no enemy of importance was nearer than ChattanoogaJanuary

All which is published for the information of the army.

II. The general commanding after a careful examination of the testimony adduced before court of inquiry, is of opinion that the defeat of our forces under Brigadier General T. T. Crittenden at Murfreesborough was chiefly owing to the withdrawal of picket guards from the roads leading to the town during the night and to the separation of the forces at the post; that the post was taken by surprise and the forces overpowered by being attacked in detail, all which would have been provided against had the timely of General Crittenden been obeyed.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

C. GODDARD,

Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

Numbers 4.

Report of Major James J. Seibert, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following as my report of the battle at Murfreesborough, Tenn., on Sunday, July 13, 1862:

I first assumed command of the cavalry attached to that command, consisting of the Third Battalion Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and one squadron of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, on May 29, but was called to Nashville on duty on June 19, returning again on July 6.

When I first assumed command it was the custom, as well as the order, of Colonel Lester, then in command, to send out daily from the cavalry a patrol of 5 men on each of the seven pikes leading to and from the town, starting out in the morning and returning in the evening. This order was not changed while I was in command until the day before the occurrence. When you assumed command your ordered me to double the number of the patrols on the roads to Lebanon and McMinnville, which was done. When the patrols returned in the evening I received the report daily from each of the non-commissioned officers in charge, which, after committing to writing, I handed to Colonel Lester.

The attack was made at daybreak in the morning, and I first saw the enemy when charging on my camp, which was a short distance to the right of the Woodbury pike. I had not over 80 duty-men in camp at the time of the attack, most of whom were captured there. We then left camp and joined the Ninth Michigan and surrendered with them at noon. I lost 5 killed and 20 wounded.

Before closing this report I would state that a report reached me about midnight that several men were seen in the night between our pickets and the town on the Bradyville pike. I immediately mounted.