This stream from the nature of its banks and crossing, would afford great facilities for a retreating army. It would only have to put out a strong rear guard to check the advance of the pursuing force, rush its artillery and train over, plant its batteries upon the most eligible points covering the crossing and approaches, move over its infantry and take position; it would be perfectly safe against three or four times its numbers. In a forward movement again it would be only necessary to leave a rear guard of moderate size to hold the crossing until the retreating army had made perhaps two to three days, while the pursuing one would be compelled to close up his troops, get them into position, and when his dispositions were completed the rear guard could pack up and move, off safely, leaving the pursuing army two or three days' march in its rear. There is no point that I am aware of, either above or below for a long distance, where it would be possible to turn either flank of a retreating army.

Question. Suppose the rebel army at Camp Dick Robinson, and its retreat by either Somerset road or by the various roads through Lebanon and Glasgow cut off by the position of the Army of the Ohio at Danville and Perryville, what lines of retreat were then open to the rebel army?

There were two lines of retreat left open. From Camp Dick Robinson there is a good leading first to Lancaster. From Lancaster are two roads, one striking the Richmond and Cumberland Gap turnpike a little distance above Big Hill; the other struck this pike some 8 miles above that point, if I recollect aright. By taking this road to Bryantsville and availing themselves of the other two from this point if brings them on to the Richmond and Cumberland Gap turnpike. There is still another line left open: 8 miles, I think, in rear of Bryantsville is Hickman's Bridge, across the Kentucky River, a fine, large bridge. In low water there is a ford a few hundred yards from it where infantry can cross. This places them on the route them into Central Kentucky. On the Nicholasville and Bryantsville turnpike, after crossing the Kentucky River, they can pass out by Lexington, Winchester, Mount Sterling, Owensville, and West Liberty, and so on through Pound Gap, getting over the Kentucky River. They can also cross at Tait's Ferry and Clay's Ferry and avail themselves of all the crossing and then converge toward Mount Sterling and Winchester. These are the only two roads that are left open of which the enemy could avail themselves from Camp Dick Robinson in retreating from the Federal forces as described.

Question. Having crossed to the north side of the Kentucky River, could they also throw themselves upon the Tait's Ferry road and the Lexington and Richmond road, and in that way get on the Richmond and Cumberland Gap road?

Yes, sir.

Question. With Dick's River, such as you have described it, running between Danville and the road from Camp Dick Robinson to Lancaster and thence on to Cumberland Gap, would the position of the Army of the Ohio at Danville have prevented or very seriously interfered the retreat of the rebel army from Camp Dick Robinson toward Cumberland Gap by the way of Lancaster, supposing it to be employed to the best advantage to prevent that movement?

I do not see how in could (such is the nature of this stream) very seriously in the direction of Richmond and Camp Dick Robinson is confined to one road, while the rebel army from Bryantsville has two, and I think three, roads. The stream is a barrier and a protection of the right flank of the rebel army in its movement. There are but a few miles of country there suitable or available for operations. I think about 25 miles would strike the rugged mountainous district, where pursuit would be almost useless, and the stream of Dick's River heads very near to these mountains. Furthermore, the bridge in the vicinity of Crab Orchard I know was burned previous to that time. It was burned by Morgan in his first raid.

Question. Supposing the retreat of the rebel army by the road from Camp Dick Robinson to Lancaster and thence on to Cumberland Gap was certain to have been foreseen, what point would it have been necessary