the same time forming a line, which I presume was a regiment and a half, across the Franklin road, about 900 or 1,000 yards distant. I placed a regiment of infantry behind a fence close by the road to conceal them from view, and threw out two companies of cavalry as a decoy, with orders to open fire upon the enemy at a long range and then retreat. The enemy accepted the challenge, charging very handsomely over the rolling piece of ground that lay between the regiment and the line they had formed. Simultaneously with that I placed the three pieces of artillery to cover their retreat, which was extending to my rear. They charged up to within a hundred yards of the line of infantry-the fence that was on the Franklin road-when they discharged their pieces, halting temporarily to do so, and then charged forward, still not seeing our concealed regiment of infantry, and within about 40 yards they received the volley of the entire regiment, which drove them back in confusion, causing considerable loss. I took advantage their retreat and the confusion they were in to withdraw my force to a better position in the rear, and in time to meet the movement from what I presume was their reserve, and moved toward the Franklin road about 2 miles from the city. They would perhaps have succeeded in getting into my rear but for a section of artillery which I had ordered from the city upon a rising piece of ground overlooking the ground upon which they were marching. The enemy then withdrew their force to La Vergne, where they remained till the arrival of General Rosecrans' army.

The troops that occupied the city of Nashville numbered about 10,000 effective men. There were 3,000 convalescents, organized into regiments, that remained in the city, and we were unable to send them out. During the siege we procured 3,500 loads of forage and provisions within a radius of 20-odd miles. The troops marched 540 or 550 miles in procuring supplies. We captured about 350 Confederate prisoners, had three engagements with the enemy, and about twenty skirmishes. Our whole loss was about 5 killed, 40 wounded, and about 60 persons captured. We lost no wagons or animals by the acts of the enemy, and the garrison was maintained in very good order and condition.

Question. Were your troops actually employed during the summer and did you succeed in inflicting punishment on those guerrilla bands that you have spoken of?

Yes, sir.

Question. Did General Bragg, in marching through Tennessee, leave any of his force to operate against Nashville?

He left General Breckinridge's division, which had been ordered into Kentucky, and had reached Knoxville on its way to Kentucky when General Breckinridge and his command were ordered to Murfreesborough.

Question. Your answer implies that they did not form part of the force with which Bragg left Chattanooga?

Yes, sir; he left none of his forces that he marched from Chattanooga with.

Question. Do you know anything of the road from McMinnville to the Sequatchie Valley by way of Altamont?

Yes, sir.

Question. Is it a practicable mountain road?

It is in the summer-time; the great difficulty is a deficiency of water.

Question. Is there not the same difficulty with all the mountain roads; that is, scarcity of water?

Yes, sir; there is but one stream of water between McMinnville and the Sequatchie Valley, and that is in the neighborhood of Altamont.

Question. Did you march with your troops to the Tennessee River opposite Chattanooga?

Yes, sir.

Question. State, if you please, what route you took.

I concentrated my forces at Pulaski; This was about the 30th of May; marched from Pulaski to Fayetteville, and found the enemy we were after had gone towards Sweeden's Cove, which is on the road to Jasper. We took the Fayetteville and Winchester road to Winchester; from Winchester, by way of Cowan, across the ridge of