Today in History:

199 Series I Volume XVI-I Serial 22 - Morgan's First Kentucky Raid, Perryville Campaign Part I

Page 199 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.

quire that our infantry of artillery should deploy at times in order to dislodge them?

Yes.

Question. Did this involve the necessity of halts or delays on the part of our columns, that our infantry might form and take the road again?

It did on two occasions, once at Stanford and the second time on the road beyond Crab Orchard. There were two other halts until our advance could dislodge the enemy's rear guard of cavalry. We did not halt for the night until 9 o'clock.

Question. Did these maneuvers of the cavalry in the rear of their infantry make corresponding halts necessary to the enemy's infantry on the retreat?

No; not at all.

Question. In the pursuit of an enemy by the roads taken by General Bragg's army after the battle of Perryville did the country afford facilities especially for defensive positions?

The country did afford facilities for defensive positions at intervals of 3 or 4 miles. Strong defensive positions could have been taken after leaving Crab Orchard.

Question. Did the enemy make use of these?

Yes.

Question. Did this involve further necessity for slow and cautious pursuit?

It did; that is, it involved the necessity for cautious pursuit. The pursuit was as rapid as we could make it under the circumstances.

Question. As the pursuit advanced did the country become more difficult for the pursuing army to form and more susceptible of defense?

It did. It became more difficult and more suspectable of defense until we reached the neighborhood of London; there the country became open against. Before we could reach London the enemy had been enabled by the obstructions places in the road to escape.

Question. Had we had as efficient and as large a force of cavalry as the enemy could we not have forced them to form the columns of infantry and five us battle on some ground favorable to ourselves?

Not unless we could have anticipated their line of retreat before they reached Crab Orchard. We might, however, if we had had a very large force of cavalry, have attacked them at London as their column was passing through while their rear was involved in the hills of Rockcastle and have thrown them into confusion.

Question. Supposing the marching qualities of both retreating and pursuing armies the same, is plenty of good cavalry necessary to force a battle from a retreating army?

I should think it was.

Question. Did the enemy's large force of cavalry and our deficiency, on the other hand, give them any great advantage in the was of enabling their infantry to form and select their own ground upon which to fight did they not feel disposed to continue their retreat?

Yes, sir; I think it did.


Page 199 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.