Today in History:

169 Series I Volume XVI-I Serial 22 - Morgan's First Kentucky Raid, Perryville Campaign Part I

Page 169 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.

Bragg had commenced crossing the Tennessee River as early as the 16th of August - that is my recollection; that by the 20th there were four divisions across. He further-more reported that it seemed to be the understanding among the citizens around Altamont that General Bragg's army, or a part of it, would cross the mountains, passing through that place.

Having no telegraphic communication myself immediately with General Buell, and General Thomas being in immediate command of all the troops in that region of country, I, on the afternoon of the same day, 23rd of August, sent him a distinct report if this information, and my recollection is that he requested me to send it immediately to General Buell - he was at the time in telegraphic communication with General Buell - from the telegraphic station at McMinnville.

General BUELL. This testimony is unnecessary. I admit that I had information of General Bragg's crossing the river earlier than that given by General Wood.

Question. If at the time of General Buell's receiving this information of crossing he had concentrated his forces at Murfreesborough for the purpose of operating against Bragg would have been the result?

It is difficult to say what might have been the result. I can suggest what in my judgment might have been the influence of such concentration, more particularly if that concentration had been followed up by other movements. I think it very likely that a concentration of the troop immediately at Murfreesborough would have had for the first result, if General Bragg had persisted in his designs of invading Kentucky, to throw his line of march much farther to the eastward than it was; perhaps, turning off at Pikeville, he would have been compelled, in order to avoid the movement upon him more into the mountains of Tennessee and perhaps Kentucky, or he would then have been compelled to turn westward, making a considerable detour. If, on the have been complected to turn westward, making a considerable detour. If, on the other hand, he had continued his line of march through Sparta and toward the point at which he crossed the Cumberland River, in my opinion the early concentration of the Army of the Ohio at Murfreesborough would have put us in a condition to have moved eastward and brought the enemy to battle somewhere in that region of country.

Question. What effect would thais change of line to the mountains have had upon General Bragg as to supplies?

I think it would have diminished his facilities and means of obtaining supplies.

Question. Was this your opinion in reference to the concentration at Murfreesborough at the time of the invasion, or is not your opinion now helped by facts that have come to your knowledge?

I am sure I entertained the opinion at the time I gained that information that our troops ought to be concentrated and so expressed that opinion to others. Of course that opinion has been strengthened by subsequent events. I rather think in the that there should be an immediate concentration of our troops. I did not of course mean to designate any particular point, for I had not the necessary knowledge of other parts of the army, even had I sufficient rank to warrant giving advice on that point.

Question. That not having been done, and it was yet a matter of doubt whether Bragg had designs upon Nashville or crossing the Cumberland, what would have been the effect of a concentration of the forces at Lebanon?

The general effect would have been the same as that produced by the concentration at Murfreesborough. I think it would have made the crossing of the Cumberland by the enemy much more dangerous and hazardous to them, and, as a consequence of that, compelled them to make their crossing higher up the Cumberland. My understanding of the country farther eastward higher up the Cumberland. My understanding of the country farther eastward is that it is more broken, and would have lessened the facilities for the enemy's getting supplies and otherwise have trammeled his movements; but as to the extent of this I cannot of course give a positive opinion.

Question. Is the lack of supplies complained of on our part a sufficient reason for the failure to do anything of this sort?


Page 169 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.