homes and are farmers when desirable, yet who meet on particular days, or if, occasion demands, are assembled by secret signals in a few hours' notice over a wide section of country, my observation has led me to the conviction that nothing but an overwhelming force of 500 or more men can march with impunity in his country; if that body marches, its approach, let it be never so rapid or secret, is heralded, and guerrillas either disappear or hang on the flanks and rear of the force as a murderous crew, and the few captures made and extent of damage inflicted on the enemy in nowise compensate for the destruction of horse-flesh and loss of men which ever attends such visits. If, on the other hand, parties of 50, 100, or 150 go on a raid their ride must be rapid and fruitless, with a quick return, or their steps are dogged, their approach heralded, the warning given, the assembly sounded by the enemy, and ten to one the party is followed and overwhelmed, or ambuscaded, with a similar result. All this is and has been the constant experience in this brigade since I joined it. True it is the country and haunts of the enemy have been boldly and frequently invaded and marched over, but the successes have been chiefly on his side, and they have so encouraged confidence in Mosby that there are but few houses that do not have an occupant in league with his band, while his captured horses and equipments have fitted them out, until Mosby, from an irresponsible wandering guide and scout, has assumed the air and dimensions of a chivalric leader. All this is susceptible of the fullest demonstration, and, in my humble judgment, there are but two ways of successfully coping with this wily and almost intangible enemy. One is the occupation of his whole country by a commanding force in every district, which in the present emergency of the country could not, of course, be spared for an enemy so insignificant in numbers and whose whole controllable force does not exceed 600 men, and whose immediate strength is not over 300. The other way is to fight him after his own manner with the force which we have, or with the Second Massachusetts, or a few companies of infantry additional. One of the modes of hostility adopted by Mosby at present is to send parties of three four or as many as ten or twelve to pass through, around, and into our lines, and after complete observations they operate against our pickets, or patrols, or small escorts. I propose by means of the secret ambuscade lines on our front and flanks, to intercept these, if possible. His parties, if above these numbers, are generally of between thirty and fifty men, rarely more, unless combined for the express purpose of surrounding or ambuscading some of our parties; with forces of such numbers he conceals himself in the forest, moving his men in a body at night, unless certain of the location and strength of our forces. It is my belief that by adopting the tactics of the enemy, by selecting and setting aside from men of this command a sufficient number as scouts and guides, retaining them on that duty, and sending our mounted parties under their guidance to desirable forest covers, always moving by night, until information by which a surprise or ambuscade of the enemy could be accomplished, that very much success could be gained which our present system of acting as regular cavalry, and almost always openly, could never enable us to attain inasmuch as our enemy can always count our numbers and ascertain our precise locality, and fight or run as he thinks proper, or use the forest to conceal him. It is true that Mosby knows the country and the people; but both would soon become thoroughly known to us, and there are many