HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tennessee February 4, 1864

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in those operations of the army which resulted in driving the rebel forces from their positions in the vicinity of Chattanooga,and of its participation, immediately afterward, in their pursuit.

In order that these operations may be distinctly understood-that the troops concerned be known and receive the honor due them-it is necessary to premise by stating that the general attack was ordered to be made on the enemy's extreme right at daylight on the 21st of November, and that preparatory orders were sent, through me, on the 18th, for the Eleventh Corps to cross to the north bank of the Tennessee River on the 20th. At this time the Eleventh, and a part of the Twelfth Corps, were encamped in Lookout Valley opposite to the left of the enemy's line.

In consequence of the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to lead off, the attack was postponed to the following morning, and again postponed until the 24th for the same reason. Meanwhile orders were received for the Eleventh Corps to go to Chattanooga, where it reported on the 22d. This divided my command, and, as the orders contemplated no advance from Lookout Valley, application was made by me to the major-general commanding the department for authority to accompany the Eleventh Corps, assigning as a reason that it was my duty to join that part of my command going into battle. This was acceded to, and, preparatory to leaving, invitation was sent for Brigadier-General Geary, who was the senior officer in my absence, to examine with me the enemy's positions and defenses, and to be informed at what points I desired to have his troops held. This was to enable me to make use of the telegraph in communicating with him advisedly during the progress of the fight, should a favorable opportunity present itself for him to advance.

On the 23d, the commander of the department requested me to remain in Lookout Valley, and make a demonstration as early as possible the following morning on the point of Lookout Mountain, my command to consist of the parts of two divisions. Later in the day,

command to consist of the parts of two divisions. Later in the day, the 23d, a copy of a telegram was received from the major-general commanding the Division of the Mississippi to the effect that in the event the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be repaired in season for Osterhaus' division of the Fifteenth Corps, to cross by 8 a.m. on the 24th, the division would report to me. Soon after, another telegram, from the headquarters of the department, instructed me, in the latter case, to take the point of Lookout Mountain if my demonstration should develop its practicability. At 2 a.m. word was received that the bridge could not be put in serviceable condition for twelve hours, but to be certain on the subject, a staff officer was dispatched to ascertain, and at 3.15 a.m., on the 24th, the report was confirmed.

As now composed, my command consisted of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth Corps; Cruft's, of the Fourth; Geary's, of the Twelfth (excepting from the two last-named divisions such regiments as were required to protect our communications with Bridgeport and Kelley's Ferry); Battery K, of the First Ohio, and Battery I, First New York, of the Eleventh Corps (the two having horses for but one); a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K, of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, making an aggregate force of 9,681.