their capture by the enemy, and to be held by us with obstinacy, only leaving them when absolutely to do so; in which case the lines on No. 3 would form our defense, and the enemy, after a stubborn fight in which he would have suffered, would only have occupied a position from which, in the former case, it would have been necessary to dislodge a mere outpost. In other words, after crippling him all we could in his successful assault upon No. 4, we would still have just as good a defense as if we had occupied No. 3 in the first place. But, on the other hand, by extending our lines to include No. 4, we made them weak in numbers at any one point, and we were consequently exposed to greater danger of being successfully assaulted along our whole position. This difficulty partially obviated by the successful construction of a dam across First Creek, by which an impassable water obstacle of

three-quarters of a mile in length was made immediately in front of and parallel to the crest of No. 3, which enabled us to greatly weaken our numbers (of infantry) on that part of the line. The general commanding yielded to my opinion and all the foregoing positions were occupied as follows:

On No. 1, Forts Sanders and Byington, and Batteries Noble and Zoellner.

On No. 2, Fort Comstock, and Batteries Galpin, Wiltise, and Billingsley.

On No. 3, Fort Huntington Smith, and Batteries Clifton Lee, Fearns, and Stearman.

On No. 4, Fort Hill.

All our works were connected by a continuous line of rifle-trenches. Between the ridge occupied by ourselves and that occupied by the enemy, the valley varied in width, but its average breadth was in the neighborhood of 1 mile. It was almost entirely cleared of timber, and was at every point under the fire of our artillery. A direct advance over it would have been made only with serious loss. This would have been particularly the case in front of No. 4, where the valley widened to 1 1/2 miles, and was without timber or cover of any kind for troops.

On the south side of the river the ground rises into a series of prominent points, the highest of which is about 350 feet, and is directly opposite Knoxville, the prolongation of Gay street passing directly over it. These knobs formed a range quite close to the river bank, with a wide valley beyond them. It was all important to us that at least three of these knobs should be held. We actually held four of them, commencing with the first hill, east of the Sevierville road, and counting down the river. As already stated the enemy made several attempts to get possession of these heights, the first being made on Sunday, November 15, by a heavy of cavalry, under the command of Wheeler, which was repulsed by Sanders' division of cavalry, which had been guarding the right bank of the Little Tennessee, and had gradually fallen back before Wheeler's heavier force. Sanders was assisted by Cameron's brigade of infantry.

From these heights an artillery fire can be delivered in front of each flank of the lines on the north side of the river.

Commencing with the most easterly hill (which we call "Sevierville Hill") and numbering them 1,2,3, and 4, our works were as follows:

On No. 1, only rifle-trenches.

On No. 2, Fort Stanley.

On No. 3, Fort Dickerson.

On No. 4, Fort Higley.