[CHAP. XLIII.

gretted that it was not at once rectified. But that mistake happened under General Hooker's very eyes; he, by giving instructions, participated in it, and of all men in the world, he was the man to remedy it. I did all I could to direct his attention to it by giving his aide all the information that was necessary. I will stretch self-criticism to the utmost limit, and say that I might have gone back when I heard that my troops were stopped at the cross-roads. But, being informed by responsible staff officers that the two brigades were under General Hooker's immediate control, had I no suppose that General Hooker knew what he was doing and what he wanted them for? Besides, I had communicated to General Hooker's aide all that was important. That aide went back to report to his chief. If anything was wrong, General Hooker, by his aide, knew where I was and could advise me. Receiving no further orders I was justified in believing that all was right. So I remained where I considered my presence most desirable. That General Hooker meanwhile held my two brigades where he did not want them, is that my mistake?

Whatever way you may turn and twist the occurrences of that night, you will always arrive at the conclusion that the mistakes committed were not my mistakes, and that of all persons that might be blamed, my troops and their commander were the very last. I think I could make even General Hooker feel the injustice of the censure contained in his report. What would he have thought if, at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, his corps commanders had received from Washington direct orders to remain in their position near United States Ford, and if then, in General Halleck's report, the following paragraph occurred:

I regret that my duty constrains me to withhold the usual commendation of courage and valor from the commander of the Army of the Potomac, who, when he heard that General Sedgwick was engaged with the enemy near Fredericksburg, remained with the whole army quiet and inactive in his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, deaf to the stirring appeals of the terrific artillery and infantry fire in the distance, which made known to him the desperate situation of his imperiled companions.

Or, another case in point. How would General Hooker feel if, on the evening of our arrival at Lookout Valley, the commander of the Eleventh Corps had received from General Thomas the direct order to camp his whole force near Brown's Ferry, and if then, in General Thomas' official report, the following passage occurred:

I regret that my duty constrains me to except in my general commendation of good judgment the major-general commanding the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, who, after having marched his troops into Lookout Valley, so far forgot all the rules of ordinary foresight and caution as to leave a weak detachment isolated at Wauhatchie, without even occupying with sufficient forces the gaps and fords and bridges through and over which the enemy could penetrate into the valley, place himself between the two camps, and overwhelm the isolated detachment with superior numbers.

How would General Hooker relish that? But if, under such circumstances, such a censure would not be considered just, what must be your opinion of the censure in General Hooker's report?

Although the parallels are striking, I will confess that the circumstances described are only made up for the sake of argument, for I do not know that General Halleck in the first, or General Thomas in the second case, gave any direct orders to corps commanders.