particulars in reference to Stuart's force, &c. It was observed by General Milroy that after June 1, the enemy in his front were becoming bolder, and this was attributed to the facts that Stuart was assembling his cavalry in force, and that the raid was impending . In his telegrams to General Schenck up to the evening of the 13th, especially in those of the 12th and 13th, he reports to the troops as having severe skirmishing with the enemy, whom he represents to be in force, but he conveys no intimation, nor had he been able to obtain any, that Lee's army was advancing . On the contrary, he expresses the opinion that the attack on Winchester (which he supposed to be made usual Valley force, somewhat increased) is but a feint to cover the raid of Stuart. No does General Schenck's information from General Kelley, up to the evening of the 13th, suggest the advance of Lee through the mountains, but, on the contrary, tends to allay any apprehensions of such advance . On the 9th, the latter general telegraphs that his scouts have returned from Snicker's Gap and saw no enemy. On the 12th, he telegraphs that his scouts are in, and have neither seen nor heard of an enemy. On the 13th, he telegraphs that he has learned that the force which occupied Berryville after McReynolds fell back to Winchester, burned the stores there, and he argues that the attack upon the town was not a movement in force . Meanwhile(on the 10th) the Secretary of War telegraphs to General Schenck that Pleasonton had sharply engaged Stuart at Beverly, and thinks the latter too much crippled to make his raid into Maryland very soon. Meanwhile, also (on the 12th), General Schenck had telegraphed the General-in-Chief., inquiring if he had knowledge of any force of infantry west of the Blue Ridge, and expressing the opinion that the troops in the Valley were only cavalry parties . On the 13th, General Halleck replies that scouts will be in on that day with more reliable information . It was on the evening of June 13, between 6 and 7 clock, that it first became known to General Milroy that the force in hid front, with which he had been skirmishing all day, was Ewell's corps . This information was obtained from a prisoner belonging to a Louisiana regiment, and is immediately telegraphed to General Schenck . Id did not, however, reach him until the morning of the 14th. In the meantime (on the evening of the 13th), Kelley had telegraphed him that his (Kelley's) scouts had learned from Citizens at Hillsborough that Lee was on his way to attack Winchester . This telegram conveyed to General Schenck, as he says, the first intimation which was given him that the force of General Lee or any infantry at all had left the front of Fredericksburg, or had come through from the east side of the Blue Ridge, the recent skirmishing which had been reported by Milroy and McReynolds having been `described as with cavalry only, aided by some artillery . Upon the receipt of this last information General Schenck immediately telegraphed to General Milroy a positive order to evacuate Winchester and fall back to Harper's Ferry . This telegram, as we have seen, never reached General Milroy, the wires between the Winchester and Martinsburg having been cut by the enemy . On the next day, also, General Schenck instructed General Kelley to convey a similar direction to General Milroy by courier from Harper's Ferry, but this was attempted without success.