far as Hood's command is concerned (and I know of no other force in that event that could oppose us), the whole country from the Tennessee River to Mobile is open to us. Should we not then improve the present opportunity for bringing Alabama-at present the best State for supplies the rebels have-under our control? I firmly believe we can, within the next few weeks, without much opposition, bring the whole State under our control.

The Tennessee River affords us a good line of communication, vastly superior to railroads. Let us establish a depot at or near the head of navigation, and, within the next ten days or two weeks, place in it, by numerous transports, abundant supplies of every kind, as we could, for the troops to be engaged in the expedition. I estimate that 40,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and one battery of artillery, to each division of infantry, with a reserve battery to each corps, would be an ample force for the expedition. To raise this force the whole country behind us, if necessary, might be almost entirely stripped of troops, as I am confident our offensive movement would abundantly protect the rear. I am quite sure, after the late experience of Hood in Tennessee, that the rebels would not attempt to check us by a counter invasion. Starting with a force composed as above, and taking with us hard bread, sugar, coffee, and a double allowance of salt for forty days, one day's salt meat in seven, a small supply of forage for exigencies, driving as many cattle with us as could conveniently be done, and trusting to the country to supply the remainder of the meat ration and forage for daily use, I have no hesitation in saying that we could eat our oysters in Mobile in forty days from the date of departure. The distance to be traversed is about 300 miles, and an average of less than ten miles a day would carry us through in the period assigned. I would suggest the route from Tuscumbia, via Tuscaloosa, Selma, giving a side wipe as we passed at Montgomery and destroying the State archives, to Mobile. I have made many inquiries touching the country adjacent to the proposed route, and am sure the roads through it are entirely practicable for military purposes, and that it teems with supplies such as a military force would require. The troops would engage in such an expedition with great ardor, and would cheerfully endure all its hardships and privations. If successful, and of this I have not the shadow of doubt, this movement would deal a blow unequaled in injurious consequences to the hated rebellion.

I respectfully submit these views to the consideration of the commanding general of the forces, and request you will lay this communication before him at your earliest convenience. I do not here touch upon the co-operation we night-in fact, should- receive from our troops on the Mississippi and in the Department of the Gulf, as such co-operation would be matter of arrangement with other commanders; but it seems to me that the arrangements for such co-operation could be made by the time the main force would be ready to move from its base on the Tennessee River.

In conclusion, I would say to the commanding general that the success of the expedition would be greatly facilitated by moving before Hood's command could be reorganized, armed, and equipped, and before a force could be concentrated from other quarters to oppose us.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. J. WOOD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.