him and Reynolds. I told him then there is no order, for that was the object of it. I then rode immediately to General Rosecrans, told him what General Wood had said, and added that General Wood had a nice little breastwork in his front and ought not to be moved, as the enemy were in the very act of attacking him, and had driven in his pickets while i was there. Just then General Crittenden started to go to General Van Cleve's command, remarking to General Rosecrans that as that was all which was left of his command he had battery go to them. General Rosecrans said, "Yes,a nd take them where that firing is," or words to that effect, pointing in the direction of General Palmer's command to our left. We immediately rode to General Van Cleve's command,and General Crittenden gave him the order to move in conformity to General Rosecrans' orders, and his troops were in motion, when an officer came from General Thomas asking urgently for further assistance. General Crittenden referred him to General Rosecrans, who was just in sight. The officer in a very short time returned with an order from General Rosecrans to send Van Cleve's division to the assistance of Thomas as rapidly as possible without too much exhausting the men. Just at that time I rode to General Wood to see his exact position. I found him not more than 100 yards in front of General Crittenden's position. General McCook was with General Wood. I mentioned it to General Crittenden, and he said he would like to see him, and I brought General McCook to him, stating to General McCook at the time that General Crittenden was not more than 100 yards to the rear of him. This was just about the time General Van Cleve received his final order to go to General Thomas' left, and I am thus particular in mentioning the facts, which do not appear to bear particularly on General Crittenden's conduct, for a special purpose. General Rosecrans, in his official report, states that great delay intervened between his giving the order for General Wood's division to occupy Negley's position and the execution of it, and that in consequence of that delay unfortunate results took place in the day. General Wood was in position by 9.30 o'clock, so Generals Rosecrans and Wood state, and that this final order was given to General Van Cleve about 12 m., so that General Negley had two and one-half hours to get to Thomas' left, and General Wood was in position two and one-half hours before the attack was made. General Wood also states in his official report that it is proper he should state that he did not see the corps commander from about 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, but he had positive evidence from my remark that General Crittenden was about 100 yards from him just in his rear at 12 m., and he understood it, of sent an officer to General Crittenden to inform him he had just received an order direct from General Rosecrans to close to the left and support Reynolds, and was executing the movement. In a very short time after this, and before I thought General McCook had time to get to his command, although it was near, we discovered that Van Cleve's troops were in confusion, and I called General Crittenden's attention to the fact that General McCook's troops were also broken and retreating, and the firing began to be pretty severe where we were, bullets flying around pretty thickly, when General Crittenden called to the staff, and said we will go to the batteries and will yet drive those fellows back and hold them in check, or something like that. We went immediately to them; found there was not an infantry man to support them. We scattered and made great effort to find some support for them. In the meantime the enemy came through the interval Wood left by his movement, but we opened upon them with the artillery and very soon drove them back. Still the enemy's sharpshooters kept up an incessant fire upon us, and killed a number of the men and artillery horses. Just at that time Lieutenant Cushing, commanding a battery of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, came forward and asked General Crittenden which way he should retire. He replied: "You are not to retire at all, but hold your position." A short time afterward Cushing came to General Crittenden and told him the enemy had got to our rear and was firing upon us. General Crittenden told him it was impossible, but started back to a rising ground in rear of the artillery to examine. Just as General Crittenden started I rode to the front the artillery and took a careful survey of the field, to see where the firing came from. I found there were no troops in line, and that there were merely skirmishers. About 100 yards to the rear General Crittenden met General Van Cleve bringing about 75 men to try and support the artillery. He ordered them to go forward promptly, and just at that time Major Mendenhall rode up and said the batteries had been taken; that it was too late. We then went right across the Dry Valley road, on a hill just back of it, where we saw a few troops, and attempted to rally them to retake the batteries. We could not succeed, and after remaining more than half an hour and until all stragglers had ceased any of you make a suggestion?" addressing himself to his staff around him. General Crittenden had previously remarked in conversation with us that he had no doubt, or the thought that General McCook and Rosecrans were both either killed or taken