send 30 mounted men by the Beaver Creek road to Huntersville, and ordered Colonel Arnett to send scouts to the same place from his camp. I received no further dispatch from Lieutenant Siple, who, it seems, in the effort to obtain information of the enemy, was cut off, and did not rejoin me until after our arrival at Union. This will in some measure explain why I had no definite information of the strength of the enemy and underestimated his force.

On the next day at 12 m., I learned from my scouts at Huntersville that the enemy were at that place and advancing on the Beaver Creek route to Mill Point. I directed Colonel Arnett to draw in Captain Marshall and to fall back to Mill Point, cutting down and blockading the road at all practicable points. By this time the mounted men of his detachment to move rapidly up the Beaver Creek route; to blockade and hold that road until Colonel Arnett passed the point of intersection of the two roads leading to Mill Point, which is 1 mile from that place, and then to fall back to Mill Point, where I proposed to make a stand. This was successfully accomplished by Colonel Thompson.

About dark Colonel Arnett passed the point aforesaid, and Colonel Thompson, slowly and in admirable order, disputing every inch of the ground, fell back before the overwhelming force of the enemy. The enemy went into camp in plain view, and made no demonstration during the night except by rocket signals, which were answered from a point near Huntersville, and also on the Beverly road beyond Marling's Bottom Bridge, although, after disposing of my force to repel assault with a view to ascertain whether they had artillery, I built camp fires in my rear. Here I again dispatched to General Echols the position of affairs.

As soon as it became light the next morning the enemy advanced skirmishers and sharpshooters, and I directed Captain Warren S. Lurty to open his artillery (two 12-pounder howitzers), and the skirmishers and sharpshooters fell back over the hill where the main force of the enemy was masked. Here it was evident that the cutting down of the roads, &c., had delayed the artillery of the enemy. The shells from Captain Lurty's pieces held the enemy in check and produced some confusion in his camp. It becoming evident from the sound that the enemy was about to make some movement, Captain L. R. Exline, with 30 men, made a successful reconnaissance, encountering and driving in the sharpshooters and returning in safety, after discovering that artillery was coming up. Knowing that with long range guns the enemy would have decidedly the advantage, I was prepared to fall back as soon as his artillery was put in position.

About 11 a. m. it was so placed, but previous thereto our shells were thrown with some effect. Accordingly my command fell back in good order under a heavy fire of five pieces of artillery and pursued by a large mounted force, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson with cavalry bringing up the rear. Arriving at Droop Mountain, I posted my artillery and infantry on that very strong position. The effort of the enemy in pursuit seemed to be to cut off Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, but in this he was foiled at the foot of the mountain by a few well-directed shells from Lurty's battery.

The enemy about 2 p. m. went into camp between Hillsborough and Mill Point, as could be plainly seen from our position. About this time I learned that General Echols was moving to my support, and during the evening Colonel Cochran, with the Fourteenth Vir-