railroad and to the left of the road leading to the station. Being then in command of the extreme right regiment, I immediately discovered that the enemy was in heavy force on my right and busily engaged in getting in position. In a few moments we were ordered to advance, and soon after the enemy's skirmishers commenced firing on my right flank. I discovered the line of battle behind the railroad, extending as far on my right as I could see; also a mass of troops lying perpendicular to the road and on the side next to us, from which body an advance was made on my right in considerable numbers. I then sent word to General Cooke that I was much annoyed by the fire and seriously threatened. I sent my right company to engage the skirmishers on my right, but they were soon driven in. I then changed the front of my regiment on the first company and checked their advance.

The brigade had again halted just before getting under fire, and I moved back just in time to join the line in its final advance. Soon after getting under fire I found that the left of the brigade had commenced firing as they advanced, which was taken up along the whole line.

Shortly afterward information was brought me that General Cooke was wounded and that I was in command. I ordered my regiment to cease firing and passed up to the center of the brigade, stopping the firing as I went. The brigade was then within 200 yards of the railroad. On getting on the top of the hill, I found the brigade suffering from a heavy flank fire of artillery from the right. The number of guns I cannot say; evidently more than one battery. Also the guns on the left and rear of the railroad had an enfilading fire on us. The musketry fire from the line of railroad was very heavy. I soon saw that a rapid advance must be made or a withdrawal. I chose the former. I passed the word to the right regiments to charge, which was done in what I conceive to be in good style. The fourth regiment was somewhat confused, but I sent the lieutenant-colonel commanding word to follow the line, which he did with about two-thirds of his regiment, the balance giving way.

The brigade charged up to within 40 yards of the railroad, and from the severity of the fire, and from their seeing the extreme left of the line falling back, they fell back - the two right regiments in good order, the third (Twenty-seventh North Carolina) in an honorable confusion, from the fact that between one-half and two-thirds of the regiment had been killed and wounded, they being in a far more exposed position than the other two regiments and having gone farther. The Forty-eighth,in advancing, encountered the whole line falling back. I halted the brigade in the first field we came to, about 400 yards from the enemy's line, from which position we well back beyond the second field on seeing the enemy come out on our right and left. After a short time the brigade of General Davis joined us on the right, when we again advanced to within 400 yards of the enemy,and on seeing the right brigade that I halted, where we remained during the night.

As there was a battery of artillery lost during the engagement, and from its proximity to the brigade the loss may be laid to it. I will state that I knew nothing of the guns being there until we had fallen back to the second field. The guns may have been in our rear, but they must certainly have been placed there after we advanced; and in retreating, our losses both by casualties and straggling,