15. Surg. A. N. Dougherty, medical director, Second Corps.

16. Captain T. L. Livermore, chief of ambulances.

Accompanying this report there is also a map* of the vicinity of Auburn, made from reconnaissances by Lieutenant Roebling, of my staff, on scale of 2 inches to the mile. Also sketch+ of bristoe, made by Sergt. E. B. Cope, by order of Major Duane, on a scale of 6 inches to the mile; also a sketch+ of the entire field of operations, on a scale of inch to the mile, taken mainly from the map furnished from headquarters, with additional reconnaissances by Lieutenant Roebling.

General Ewell, on leaving Auburn, took the main road to Greenwich instead of following me to Catlett's Station. This enabled General Lee to be prepared to fight with his whole army at Greenwich if necessary, as Hill's corps, turning off the Warrenton pike at New Baltimore, also passed by way of Greenwich. General Ewell then took a blind track across the field and through the woods, so as to not interfere with the other column or be retarded by it, but he found it very difficult for his artillery, as our examinations showed, and lost much time, which, in addition to the delays we had given him at Auburn, prevented his reaching Bristoe in time to bring his force into action.

Our enemy was thoroughly acquainted with this section of country, it being the home of general Ewell, while we were quite ignorant of some of the important routes. This seems quite inexcusable after our having occupied the country so long, and been so fully made aware of its importance by the successful operation which general Ewell had conduct the year before in General Pope's Virginia campaign, by which our trains were captured, and all our communications broken from Kettle Run to Bull Run.

I append also some extract from the report of General Lee, as printed in Richmond newspapers.++ from this it will be seen that, on October 14 the Second Corps at different times encountered the advance of each wing of his army, as well as a portion of his cavalry. That though he set out, as he says, early on the 14th, we detained him with Ewell's corps and the main body of the cavalry at Auburn, only about 5 miles from his starting point, until noon, and that we nevertheless reached Bristoe in time to meet and repulse the advance of General Hill's corps, which had a good road, unobstructed, only about 4 miles longer than our own. The principal result of that repulse he states correctly. The result, too, shows conclusively that any information which reached general Meade of the enemy advancing along the pike from Warrenton past Buckland Mills toward Centreville was erroneous, and furnishes a marked example of the paramount importance of accurate information. For, if the truth had been known, a concentration of our army at Bristoe, easily to have been affected, would have brought on pitched battle where we could hardly have failed to win.

I conclude my report with the expression of my feelings, almost of gratitude, toward the Second Army Corps, especially to the Commanders of division and brigades, and the staff officers at these headquarters. Temporarily commanding the corps, during the absence of Major-general Hancock, its permanent commander, absent by reason of wounds received at gettysburg, I found each department so well filled that I could not wish change it. The conduct of these officers under me has given them an additional claim to the

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*See p. 1018

+To appear in atlas.

++See report of October 23, p. 410.

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