CHAP.XII.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.

presence of 40 U. S. cavalry. Our men fell back and sent for re-enforcements. I sent on 20 more cavalry to join them, and ordered 60 more to keep well in advance of our infantry and to keep up communication with the party in chase. By the time we had advanced 7 miles night was coming on, I found the Cross-Roads were 16 instead of 9 miles distance, and the enemy's scouts were seen on our flanks and evening our rear.

In this state of affairs I halted the main body, taking up a strong position on Skaggs' Creek. I could not tell whether we were approaching an army or a mere scouting party; I was completely in the dark. I knew nothing of the general movements of the enemy, not having heard from Bowling Green since I left. I knew, however, they were in great force in front and might get in our rear. In this emergency I determined to have our train loaded for any movement. A hotly pressed retreat through 50 miles of hostile country would, I feared, prove very disastrous, and I determined not to be caught in such a trap. I had false camp fires lighted on every surrounding hill, and a wide line of outlying pickets. In the mean time our cavalry pressed the enemy in the direction of the Cross-Roads so closely that they got confused and dispersed in the woods at McRea's Cross-Roads. Our cavalry fell on the main body of the enemy's cavalry, about 100 strong, and after a little skirmish, in which the enemy broke and left and got 2 of their men killed, other men and horses wounded, without damage to us, our cavalry fell back 5 miles to camp for the night.

During the evening and night we captured a number of U. S. dragoon horses, fully accoutered, a number of muskets, pistols, and sabers. a great deal of credit is due Major Harrison, of the Rangers, also Captain Philips, volunteer, for the way they managed to disorganize and disperse this large body of the enemy's cavalry in an unknown country in the night,and without one friend among the country people. My infantry pickets captured several U. S. horses, fully accoutered in the most approved style, within our lines. The truth is, the rush of the rangers so dispersed and confused the enemy that they got lost and were wandering about in every direction, and this accounts for their appearance on our flanks and rear.

I sent Lieutenant Cage, of my regiment, with a dispatch to Major Harrison at midnight, ordering him to fall back on me. Cage and his escort lost their way, got almost into the enemy's lines, and in returning were fired on by our cavalry picket, and returned the fire before the sad mistake was found out. Cage was shot in the leg, his horse was twice shot, and Bankhead, of the Rangers, was shot badly in the leg and arm. Yesterday morning, finding the road clear beyond the Cross-Roads, the enemy all fled, and thinking [it] imprudent to advance, blindfold as I was, I commenced returning by the same route I came,and am here this morning. The Rangers advanced to and beyond the Cross-Roads and up the Glasgow; they heard artillery in the direction of Columbia, and believe a force is advancing along that road. They left Cross-Roads at 1 o'clock yesterday and reached here, a distance of 23 miles, last night.

I doubt whether any force is advancing, and do no think the enemy's cavalry will visit this section soon again. If energetic, the enemy may advance along the Columbia and Jamestown road an attempt to cut us off. I have sent a strong cavalry force ahead to guard against this. The road mentioned is a good one, and Jamestown is as close to Columbia as Tompkinsville. Our advance has been fired at twice from