CHAP.XII.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.

by the citizens, and in his opinion there is danger of aid being given to Lincoln by the people of East Tennessee at an unexpected moment and seizure of the railroad. He requests me to suggest to you the necessity of rendezvousing several regiments immediately. I give you this information at his pressing instance. Election Wednesday. result doubtful.

I have the pleasure to be, your obedient servant, REUBEN DAVIS.

KNOXVILLE, TENN., November 4, 1861.

HonorableJEFFERSON DAVIS, President, &c.:

SIR: I had intended to make the suggestions which follow several weeks since, but the menacing attitude of the enemy on the Potomac led me to postpone them till to-day. The splendid fight at Leesburg on the 21st ultimo and other incidents of the war encourage me to hope that you will not consider the suggestions unnecessary or inopportune.

The enemy intends to carry into effect the policy, long entertained and strenuously advised by Andrew Johnson and others, of invading East Tennessee. This may be attempted, not via cumberland Gap, as generally apprehended, but via Jamestown and the several passes in Fentress County, where the mountain is much lower and the country more accessible. The inhabitant on that route are more rebellious and more disloyal to your Government. A radius of 50 miles, with Jamestown or Hunstville as a center, will embrace a population, both in Kentucky and Tennessee, of anti-southern communities as can be found south of the Ohio. That population is nearer to our railroad then any other point-much more so than that contiguous to Carter and Johnson Counties, also a disloyal neighborhood. Camp McGinnis is more vulnerable then Cumberland Gap, having fewer fortifications and fewer natural defenses. We need, therefore, to guard against invasion from that quarter; and while every one admits the bravery and vigilance of the officer in command (Captain Bledsoe, I believe), we all believe that the officer in command (Captain Bledsoe, I believe), we all believe that the safety of the country demands that he be re-enforced. If you could spare General Elzey from the Potomac, with Colonel J. C. Vaughn and the other regiments with him, and assign to them the disaffected country I have indicated as above, you will produce-1st. The entire acquiescence of the Tennessee malcontents, and make them assume at least a seeming loyalty and keep them on this side of the line. 2nd. As these officers and their men have seen service elsewhere, they would inspire the enemy across the line with a wholesome dread of invasion-a respect for our experience as well as our prowess. 3rd. It will excite (revive is not the word) the spirit of volunteering, which I am humiliated to say is very low. Could our young men, our citizens generally, see Colonel Vaughn and his brave men among us and hear a recital of the vincibility of Lincoln's minion, s&c., the old spirit of Sevier and Jackson would return to our deluded and misled masses, the standard of patriotism would be elevated, and our young soldiery be excited from very shame to rally to the defense of Tennessee. 4th. The Tennesseans on the Potomac know all these mountain passes,and are the very troops to cross them and fight beyond them. Let Elzey lead a brigade north from Camp McGinnis, Zollicoffer another in the direction of Lexington, and Buckner another to Louisville. They will scatter dismay in the Kentucky ranks them rom embodying,