loss in every instance. Several hundred prisoners were taken, but I cannot now say what number nor estimate our or the enemy's casualties. During the night the enemy made several assaults to regain what they had lost, but failed.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

Major-General HALLECK,

Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Cold Harbor, Va., June 3, 1864 - 2 p. m.

(Received 7.55 a. m., 4th.)

We assaulted at 4.30 a. m. this morning, driving the enemy within his entrenchments at all points, but without gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now occupy a position close to the enemy, some places within 50 yards, and are entrenching. Our loss was not severe nor do I suppose the enemy to have lost heavily. We captured over 300 prisoners, mostly from Breckinridge's command.

U. S. GRANT.

Lieutenant-General.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL: A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would

not be practicable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use if for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength in guarding it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breast-works, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have, therefore, resolved upon the following plan: I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorably circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected, I will move the army to the south side of James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on the north side and crossing