endeavor to put on paper as well as I can, amid the pressure of my engagements in the field, the views which I expressed to you. Some of the difficulties to be avoided or met by reorganization are as follows:

First. The impossibility of keeping the force in the field necessary for operations to an effective standard.

Second. The want of instruction to the recruits, both officers and men, that are sent into the field, rendering them for months nearly useless.

Third. The want of any reserve force, so in case of raids or attacks upon the northern lines at Washington or Cincinnati to avoid the necessity of bringing back troops from the front to meet incursions of the enemy.

Fourth. The impossibility of getting sick and wounded men who are sent to hospital back to their regiments.

Fifth. The want of regularity of payment, accounts, and records of the soldiers in the field.

Sixth. The great pressure upon the central offices at the War Department of the records of all the details of the administration of the regiment.

Seventh. The need of responsibility to the head of the regiment of the administration of the staff department, such as medical, pay, quartermaster, ordnance, and commissary.

Eighth. The want of accountability of the staff department, because of the change of locations and commanders of regiments, for the kind and quality of the equipment and stores furnished.

The science of war and of administration of warlike affairs, although the study of hundreds of years in Europe, is practically comparatively new in this country. It would seem to be,therefore, the part of wisdom to examine and adapt, so far as practicable, the system of organization, expedients, and devices which are found to be serviceable in countriesmies are permanently kept, having in view the fact that hereafter the necessities of this coun a very much larger force than ever heretofore because from the action of this war we have become essentially a warlike people. The arguments against standing armies which pressed upon our fathers at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that they might be wielded by a monarch against the liberties of the people, does not now apply. The result of the late election convinces every reflecting mind that our "bayonets think," and that the sympathies, feelings, wishes, the political desires and aspirations of the Army are in full accord with the people at home, only lighted up with a more fervid and vivid patriotism. The question only, then is how the Army of the United States, now composed of troops of twenty different nations, and when the authority of the Union is extended over all our borders of some thirty-six States, or more, can be consolidated or nationalized as a national institution as the militia was intended by provisions of the Constitution.

The system of organization which is hereinafter crudely set forth is the result of some reflection upon the French organization, and is an attempt to adapt it to the wants of the American Army as they have pressed upon me from now nearly four years" experience in the field. The reflections of gentlemen of skill and experience will supply many details overlooked by me or not set forth in this paper. I would make the regiment the unit of organization for administration and the division the unit of organization for offensive operations. The regiment should consist of 2,400 men as the maximum, 1,800 as