six fords on the Potomac, with the stipulation that said force shall not be required for any other than this special service, and that it shall be "credited to the quota of their several States on the call just made, and be armed, equipped, and supplied as other volunteers in the service." I do not think the law would justify the adoption of this proposition. Section three of the act approved February 13, 1862, says "that no volunteers or militia from any State or Territory shall be mustered into the service of the United States on any terms or conditions confining their service to the limits of said State or Territory or their vicinities, beyond the number of 10,000 in the State of Missouri and 4,500 in the State of Maryland, heretofore authorized by the President of the United States or Secretary of War to be raised in said States." Besides this, to raise and credit troops for special local service violates a principle which both reason and experience show to be important to the success of the recruiting service and to the welfare of the army at large. In this particular case, if the above facts should be disregarded, I don"t believe the object could be accomplished in the way proposed. To give "complete protection to this part of our frontier" it would be necessary to guard many more than "five or six" fords. The damage to the people which the Governors speak of may be expes usually been committed by cavalry, and usually in small numbers. To provide against their raids by the use of special volunteers in fortifications, it is plain that it would be necessary to construct and man a line nearly continuous from Grat Falls to the upper watters of the Potomac. If the "five or six" principal fords only were defended by the proposed volunteers, they could not prevent the cavalry raids or make any serious opposition to a determined movement of troops of all arms. In fact, it is more probable, in case of such an advance, that these isolated fortifications behind the Potomac, prepared andocal volunteers, would be captured and made covers for the enemy, than that they would prevent his operations. I am sure that the object Governors Bradford and Curtin have in view cannot be accomplished by the plan they propose, and that to undertake it would injure the service at large and put the Government to unnecessary expense. If a fortified line is to be held, the best way to accomplish the object will be to raise full quota of troops for general service under the President's last call. I think Maryland and Pennsylvania would be much better protected against invasion and raids by fortifying securely and garrisoning Strasburg, Front Royal, Warrenton, and Fredericksburg, thus removing our frontier from the Potomac, than by fortifying and garrisoning six fords on that river.

JAMES B. FRY,

Provost-Marshal-General.

Approved.

E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPT., PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

July 21, 1864.

GOVERNOR OF MINNESOTA,

Saint Paul, Minn.:

SIR: You are hereby authorized to raise a regiment of volunteer infantry, under the call of the 18th instant for 500,000 men. The