embrace all persons to whatever class they may belong, and that these articles form part of an act of Congress the constitutionality of which is not a proper question for the decision of those whose duty it is to obey the law. A more careful examination of these articles will relieve us of the necessity of inquiring how far obedience is due to an unconstitutional law, for I think it will appear that they are not in the least repugnant to the Constitution. The language of the Fifty-seventh Article of War, which is relied on as giving authority to military courts to try and punish this class of offenders, is:

Whosoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial.

However comprehensive the term "whosoever" may at first glance appear, it should be recollected that penal statutes and those which are in derogation of common right must be strictly construed and cannot be enlarged by implication. It is also a well-settled rule of interpretation that all laws must be construed with reference to their subject-matter and the object the Legislature had in view in their enactment.

The title of the act of which the Articles of War form a part is "An act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the Confederate States," and the first paragraph of the first section is in the following words:

That from and after the passage of this act the following shall be the rules and articles by which the armies of the Confederate States shall be governed:

Here the Legislature has given an explicit declaration of the object for which the law was enacted and clearly marked the class of persons upon whim it was intended to have effect. Every word in the act, therefore, must be construed with reference to this declaration and be limited by it, however general or comprehensive it may at first appear to be. The word "whosoever," then, in Article 57, must be construed to mean whosoever belonging to the armies of the Confederate States. Indeed, the connection in which this article stands would justify such a construction, apart from the considerations already mentioned, for in Article 55 this limitation is made in express terms. It reads as follows:

Whosesoever belonging to the armies of the Confederate States in foreign parts shall force a safeguard shall suffer death.

Article 56 provides that "whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money, victuals," &c., and then follows Article 57, already quoted. The connection in which these three articles stand warrants the conclusion that they are intended to apply to the same class of persons and that the words "belonging to the armies of the Confederate States" were omitted in the last two merely to avoid tautology.

Again, in different articles the persons who are subjected to military law are enumerated in detail; for example, we find provision made for the trial and punishment of "all officers," "all non-commissioned officers and soldiers. " In Article 60 it is provided that-

All sutlers and retainers to the camp and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of the Confederate States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders according to the rules and discipline of war.

Article 96 provides that-

All officers, conductors, gunners, matrosses, drivers or other persons whatsoever receiving pay or hire in the service of the artillery or Corps of Engineers of the Confederate States shall be governed by the aforesaid rules and articles, &c.

And Article 97 makes the same provision in relation to the militia when in actual service of the Confederate States.