is overwhelming to that fact. There is a conflict of proof among the three witnesses for the prosecution- Satterwhite, Simpson and Colonel Day - as to the circumstances under which the firing occurred, while every wittness in the cause is in conflict with the testimony of Colonel Day. Satterwhile says there were two reports of fire - arms, though he saw but one. Simpson says there was but one and he saw it all. Colonel Day admits more firing. The statement of Colonel Day of a body of armed men, fifteen or twenty in number, chased for one half a mile on the road leading to Sedalia is not only without support but against the testimony of every witness in the cause. No such body of men was seen that day at or near Georgetown. The men under my command entered the town from the west an hour before the entrance of the Federaal soldiers and they had not left it when the cavalry entered it. He is obviously mistaken as to the point at which his soldiers and himself entered the town. The conjoint testimony of Thompson, Sanders and the two Browns establish [if human testimony can do it] two facts: first. that the attack was made by the Federal soldiers; second, that they were first to begin the fire. it is equally clear that the charge of firing was at me and my command. A firing in defense of such attack cannot be calied either wanton or malicious without a flagrant abuse of laguage. It was not done in " wantonness, " for homicide except for justifiable cause is abhorrent to my nature. It was not done in " malice " for I did not know him nor had I ever seen him or heard that he had done me or mine precious wrong.

Some injustice has been done me unintentionally by a misapprehension of Colonel Hughes in regard to our conversation at Sedalia when he kindly visited me while under guard. He did not ask nor did I give him a detail of the circumstances that transpired at Georgetown. He says he took to for granted that I took it for granted he, Colonel Hughes, knew all about the circumstances. Our conversation as he says was constrained, being in the presence of an oficcer. At one period of his testimony he says that I said, " I would not have shot if I had thought they were U. S. troops or soldiers. " Again in repeating the conversation he says that I said, " I would have surrendered if I had thought they were U. S. troops or soldierouble misapprehension. As to the shooting I told him distinctly [as he admist] that I shot in self

[defense] to save my own life. The other phrase, " surrender, " had no reference to the shooting whatever. It had exclusive reference to the scene in Kidd's Hotel. I had gained the attic or the hotel and was pursued by a crowd. I was armed with a revolver and they could not reach me without peril to the lives o six of them. I thought it was their surpose it kill me in the spot, and I had resolved to die there selling my life as dearly as I could. They told me to come down. I refused and they did not think proper to ascend to me. I refused to surrender to them without an express understanding that I was to be reated as a prisoners of war and protected from violence. They at last agreed to my terms. Now the idea I attempted to convey was not that I would have surrendered to the U. S. soldiers on their entrance or dash into the town - not at all, for I never thought of such a thing - but that when approached in the attic I would have readily surrendered there without resistence if I had been dealing exclusively with U. S. soldiers for from them I did not anticipate violence. This misapprehension has led to the inquiry by the president of the commission and the judge - advocate whether at that time the home guards were in uniform. It my words had been understood in their proper context it is obvious the inquiry could have no significance. If if shall be held