Ninth Indiana and Second Virginia on the other side. Many of them, too, had by this time exhausted their ammunition, and had to supply themselves the best way they could from the cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded of both sides, and our ranks were still becoming more and more thinned by frequent desertions to the rear, notwithstanding every exertion of the officers to prevent it. Being in great doubt and uncertainty about our friends whose fire we had been momentarily expecting to hear, but in which we were agonizingly disappointed, it was finally determined to make a last determined rally and drive the rebels back and bring away our dead and wounded. By great and active exertions this was effected. The rebels were for the last time driven back to the cover of their cabins, many of our boys firing last cartridge after them. Our remaining wounded were gathered up and our small remaining forces withdrew in good order. It was not till after our forces had come down off the mountain and to the pike that the firing of our forces on the other side under Colonel Moody was heard. The force then remaining had dwindled down to a rear guard of not over 150 men, and there was no way to get across to Colonel Moody except through the rebel camp, which appeared rather a hard road to travel, and the nearest practicable route around to him was by Camp Bartow, a distance of seventeen miles. I started with a few of Bracken's cavalry and rode rapidly around to where Colonel Moody was, and reached him about 5 p. m., and found that he had just got his forces down off the mountain (on which the enemy's camp was situated) with his wounded, after having buried his dead with their bayonets and swords. Colonel Moody's report* of the attack by the troops under his command is herewith transmitted and adopted as a part of this report. The whole number killed of our forces in the affair, including the two killed the day before, is -. The whole number wounded, including those wounded the day before, is -.+ A large portion of the wounded are slight.

There is not a doubt but had Colonel Moody reached his point of attack at the time appointed, and the attack on each side been simultaneous, as intended, it would have been a complete success; but he was unavoidably [delayed] - as he shows - by unforeseen circumstances until the enemy with the whole of their forces had repulsed our first attack, and were thereby enabled to use the whole of their force in repelling our second attack. I cannot speak too highly of the officers who acted under my immediate command. Colonel Jones especially proved himself to be a cool man and accomplished officer. Major Dobbs and Captain Myers, Newland, Johnson, Clinton, Kirkpatrick, and Harrington, of the Thirteenth Indiana, and Captains Charlesworth, Crowell, Johnson, and Askew, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, and Captain Hamilton, of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers, all acted nobly, as did Lieutenants Durbin and Shields, of the Thirteenth Indiana, and Lieutenants Dirlam, Merryman, Wood, Haughton, and Bowlus, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, and Lieutenant Brandt, of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers. I owe the warmest thanks to Lieutenant Isaiah B. McDonald, of your staff, for the able and efficient assistance which he rendered me on the march and in the action. He was very useful, by his activity, coolness, and bravery, in leading and rallying troops. Lieutenant John O. Cravens, of my staff, by his activity, bravery, and energy, was also very useful to me. Captain Bracken, with his effective squad of cavalry, was on hand, but the ground was wholly unfit for the use of cavalry. Too much praise cannot be given to the brave soldiers

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* Not found.

+ See return of casualties, VOL. V, p. 457.

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