ginia Cavalry. Our casualties, 1 man, Second Maryland, wounded, 2 horses of the First New York killed.

After driving the enemy through the gap, Major Cole asked leave to pursue him to the junction of the Moorefield and New Creek roads. This I refused, as at that moment Captain Firey and Lieutenant Rivers returned, both bringing information, that the enemy was in strong force on the west side of the mountain, and numbering not less than 3,000 men of all arms; also, that the advance under Rosser had not reached above Frankfort. I waited until Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson and my wagon train arrived, and left Romney for Springfield at 4 a. m. hoping to head off the enemy and to protect the bridge at Green Spring run.

Upon arriving at Springfield, I sent a party to Frankfort and another to Green Spring Run. Upon their return I found Rosser had retreated on one side of the mountain while I passed up ont he other. I returned to Romney and halted my command to rest and feed, while I rode through the gap to communicate with the force from New Creek. I overtook there, 16 miles from Moorefield, Colonel Thompson's command and the portion of the Fifteenth I left at Blue's Gap, all having joined Colonel Mulligan. Colonel Thompson informed me that orders had been sent me to move to Moorefield, that I might sent my artillery to Burlington, as Colonel Mulligan had then eight or nine guns. I returned to Romney, and marched with my command at 1 a. m. for Moorefield by the old road, sending Captain Hicks' squadron of the Fifteenth by the new road, to notify Colonel Mulligan of my whereabouts.

I arrived in sight of Moorefield at dawn of the 4th instant. Sent a party to communicate with Colonel Mulligan, whose command just came in sight on the new road, 5 miles from the town. I at once pushed forward; Major Quinn, being in the advance, dashed after the enemy's pickets in a splendid manner, driving them back precipitately on the main body. At this point I received orders from Colonel Mulligan that he depended upon my command to gain the earliest intelligence of the enemy, his numbers, position, and intentions. I about fifteen minutes I was able to inform him the enemy occupied Moorefield, numbering 1,000 cavalry and about 500 infantry. His intentions were evidently to cover the retreat of his train through the mountain pass or gap 3 miles in rear of the town.

I was then ordered to watch my left flank, as it was found the enemy meditated an attack in that direction. I had already sent two companies toward the Wardensville road for that purpose, but they were driven back by a gun stationed at the first ford. I sent to the colonel commanding asking that the gun at the ford be sent across to me. This he did not deem proper to do, but informed me he would send one to Inskip's Ford, which he did, but with no better results than the first, the shells all bursting either in rear of Major Quinn's line or among his skirmishers. Major Quinn kept continually informing us that the enemy was falling back, and that unless soon attacked he would be in the defile and beyond our reach. I attempted to join him at all hazards, and was going up at a gallop, when I received peremptory orders from Colonel Mulligan I must move no farther; that the enemy's falling back was for the purpose of entrapping us, as he had information that a large force of infantry and twelve guns were on our left flank. He ordered me to send 200 men to scour the hills, and to move up only as fast as they were able to move through the hills on our left.