saddled my horse, rode to the point of observation, saw a considerable force which I knew was rebel cavalry. At this time the sergeant-major of Colonel Garis' regiment came to me and reported that colonel Garis had been attacked by 1,500 of Morgan's cavalry; that he would hold the town as long as he could, and wished me to come to his assistance as speedily as possible. I ordered the lieutenant-colonel to form the line, and rode back and reported to Captain Butler. He directed me to wait until General Hobson should come forward. He soon came forward. My line was forming in good style, faced toward the rebel approach. By the time General Hobson came up, a large column of cavalry was coming down the road toward us, either for the purpose of getting between us and Colonel Garis or to get to colonel Garis' rear; and by direction of General Hobson, I placed two companies, under command of Major Fowler, on a point of the hill across the railroad. These companies opened fire upon the column immediately and drove it back, several saddles being emptied at the first fire. I had in my command 690 officers and men. This included musicians, hospital attendants, and all supernumeraries. There were about 100 men of different detachments on General Hobson's train, mostly from Kentucky regiments. These men and one company from my regiment were thrown forward as skirmishers, General Hobson assuming command of the whole force, and Captain Butler, of the staff, having charge of the skirmish line. The battle opened about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was hotly contested on both sides. The force directly opposing us from the start was Colonel Giltner's brigade, of Morgan's command, 1,500 strong, armed with the Enfield rifle. This brigade dismounted and advanced as infantry. We held them in check and drove them back twice, and had there been no other force, we should have been the victors on the field. Between 11 and 12 o'clock another brigade came into our rear and took position in a wheat-field; besides, another had flanked around and took position on our right flank and rear. This was commanded by Colonel Martin, and the other by General Morgan in person. I made disposition of my exhausted and scattered command to meet it. I placed all I could spare from my front line against a high fence to our rear where they would be partially protected by the two fences of a lane. By the time the dispositions could be made a flag of truce was seen approaching our lines. I was directed by General Hobson to receive it. I went out and met Captain Morgan, of General Morgan's staff. He carried a demand from General Morgan for our surrender as prisoners of war. I started to report to General Hobson, and on my way was summoned to meet another flag carried by the rebel Colonel Martin. I replied to him that I was considering then a demand from General Morgan. I reported to General Hobson. He asked my opinion about it. I told him that I could hold out an hour longer, but that the end was plainly to be seen unless relief was at hand, and we knew of none. General Hobson thought I could not hold out more than twenty minutes, or thirty at most. We were unanimous in the conclusion that from the exhausted condition of the men, having been fighting six hours without rest or water, that we could not hold out much longer if attacked vigorously from front, rear, and flanks, and to save the slaughter that must ensue from such an attack policy and duty alike required a surrender. Colonel Garis had surrendered as we believed more than four hours before. No firing had been heard from that quarter since early in the morning, and a scout we had sent to ascertain the result had been driven back by rebel pickets. I was then deputed to arrange the terms of surrender, which